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Opposition to the international criminal court, the refusal to sign the 
Kyoto agreement on global warming, the unwillingness to join a global 
ban on land mines, and the war in Iraq are only a few examples of the 
United States’ reluctance to heed world opinion or join multilateral hu-
manitarian efforts. This chapter focuses on another example of Ameri-
can “exceptionalism”: the U.S. record on ratification of International 
Labour Organization (ILO) conventions. 
To date, the United States has ratified only 14 of the 184 conven-
tions adopted by the ILO1 and only 2 of the 8 core conventions2 (ILO 
2002). Only 23 of the 175 ILO member nations have ratified fewer 
conventions; none of these nations is western or industrialized (ILO 
2002).3 Until 1988, the United States had ratified only one convention 
that did not concern a maritime issue, a purely administrative matter 
that switched the ILO’s affiliation from the defunct League of Nations 
to the newly formed United Nations. There has been a spate of activity 
in the past 15 years, but of the 6 conventions ratified since 1988, half 
concern administrative or technical matters.4 
We examine U.S. reluctance to ratify the ILO conventions concern-
ing the freedom of association and right to bargain collectively: Con-
vention 87 and Convention 98.5 Both conventions were adopted by the 
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ILO in the late 1940s, and while Convention 87 was recommended for 
ratification by the Secretary of Labor in 1949 and by the Solicitor of 
Labor in 1980 (U.S. Department of Labor 1980; U.S. Senate 1949), no 
legislative action has been taken on either. 
The United States offers three principal reasons for not ratifying 
Conventions 87 or 98. First, national labor policy is well established, 
insures a delicate balance between the interests of business and labor, 
and should not be upset to accommodate the wishes of an international 
agency. Second, based on the recent ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work (ILO 1998), as well as long-standing 
ILO policy,6 the United States has a responsibility as a member of the 
ILO—and regardless of whether it has ratified the conventions or not—
to uphold the spirit of Conventions 87 and 98. Since the United States 
largely fulfills that responsibility, actual ratification is superfluous (ILO 
2000; U.S. Department of Labor 1997a,b; U.S. Senate 1985). Third, our 
federal system, which reserves certain rights to the states, impedes rati-
fication since the conventions would affect the employees of state and 
local governments and others who fall outside the coverage of federal 
labor statutes.7 We dispute all three claims.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The United States was instrumental in both establishing the ILO 
and assuring that its constitution took into account the concerns of fed-
eral states (Tayler 1935). After weeks of difficult negotiations with sev-
eral European delegates, the United States was successful in including 
language in Article 19 of the ILO constitution that protects the interests 
of such states by allowing them to treat a draft convention “as a recom-
mendation only” (Tayler 1935, p. 62). In fact, when the United States 
joined the ILO in 1934, the congressional resolution supporting admis-
sion cited the provision (Tayler 1935, p. 150). However, legal scholars 
immediately raised questions as to whether the federal state proviso 
would apply to the United States based on a 1920 Supreme Court deci-
sion.8 Further, business interests were wary of ILO goals: the adoption 
of Conventions 87 and 98 so soon after the passage of the Taft-Hartley 
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Amendments only increased their suspicion that the ILO might override 
U.S. labor law (Galenson 1980, p. 27; Lorenz 2001, p. 171). 
With this concern over the power of the United Nations and its 
specialized agencies, Senator John Bricker proposed a constitutional 
amendment in 1951 that would have limited the executive branch’s 
treaty-making power. During hearings on the Bricker Amendment, the 
ILO came in for particularly harsh treatment.9 No version of the Bricker 
Amendment passed, but its spirit continues to control U.S. policy con-
cerning ILO conventions: no convention will be adopted that could in-
terfere with existing state or federal law.
In 1978, due mainly to disputes centered on cold war and Middle 
East politics, the United States withdrew from the ILO only to rejoin 
less than three years later. With reentry, the United States appeared to 
have made a fresh start in its relations with an organization that it had, 
over the years, treated casually at best (Galenson 1980, pp. 23–26). 
A major move was the creation of the high-level President’s Advisory 
Committee on the ILO, which is chaired by the Secretary of Labor and 
includes the Secretaries of State and Commerce as well as labor and 
business representatives. The Tri-Partite Advisory Panel on Interna-
tional Labor Standards (TAPILS) chaired by the Solicitor of Labor and 
providing legal analysis to the President’s Committee was also estab-
lished (U.S. General Accounting Office 1984, pp. 16–26).10 The job of 
both bodies is to make determinations about ILO conventions. At one 
time, both were quite busy; after ratifying no conventions for 35 years, 
the United States ratified seven between 1998 and 2001 (ILO 2002). 
However, Conventions 87 and 98 received no attention.
Momentum for new ratifications began with hearings by a Senate 
committee in 1985 (U.S. Senate 1985). Secretary of State George Schul-
tz argued that ratifications would be helpful in pressing his (anti-Soviet) 
agenda: “It is my judgment that an improved ratification record would 
have served U.S. foreign policy interests better” (U.S. Senate 1985, p. 
8). Although basic ILO principles are found in U.S. laws, Schultz be-
lieved that the United States was still vulnerable to criticism for not 
ratifying ILO conventions: “[O]ur behavior sends a message that ILO 
procedures do not apply to us. The message we send is—do as we say, 
not as we do” (U.S. Senate 1985, p. 9). 
However, shortly before Schultz’s testimony, a number of legal 
problems concerning ratification of Conventions 87 and 98 had been 
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laid out in an influential book by Edward E. Potter (1984).11 Potter’s 
findings formed the basis of the U.S. Council on International Business 
(USCIB) opposition to the ratification of these conventions.12 The prin-
cipal concerns expressed in Potter’s book echo the Bricker-era rhetoric: 
if ILO conventions were ratified, existing laws would be superseded. 
In turn, committee chair Orrin Hatch stated his concern that domestic 
labor laws “have been delicately drawn and have a delicate balance and 
which, although both sides can point to difficulties with them from time 
to time, still have worked rather well in our country” (U.S. Senate 1985, 
p. 11). According to U.S. Department of Labor and ILO officials with 
whom we spoke, the present posture of the United States is to ratify 
only conventions that conform to current U.S. law. The job of TAPILS, 
therefore, is to make sure that conventions under consideration do not 
interfere with any current statute. Hence, Conventions 87 and 98 are 
“off-the-table” for many of the reasons cited in Potter’s book.
A Critique of the U.S. Position
To reiterate, the current U.S. position against ratification of ILO 
Conventions 87 and 98 is based largely on three assertions: 1) that well-
established national labor policy supports a delicate balance between 
business and labor and should not be meddled with; 2) that under the 
recent Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 
as well as the ILO constitution, the United States has a responsibility, 
based on its membership in the ILO, to conform to the spirit of Conven-
tions 87 and 98—which it already does (ILO 2000; U.S. Department 
of Labor 1997a,b; U.S. Senate 1985); and 3) that our federal system, 
which reserves certain rights to the states, makes ratification problem-
atic since the conventions would affect employees who fall outside the 
coverage of federal labor statutes.
Federal Labor Policy and the Balance of Interests
First, we address the assertion that current labor policy is well-es-
tablished and provides for a balance in labor–management relations. 
While current labor policy has its roots in statutes that are seven de-
cades old, age should not be confused with acceptance.13 Organized la-
bor, in particular, has long fought for changes in labor policy. In the late 
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1940s and early 1950s the labor movement pushed for Taft-Hartley re-
peal (Dulles and Dubofsky 1984, pp. 343–362); some years later, labor 
sought substantial changes to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 
through the unsuccessful Labor Law Reform Act of 1978 (Dark 1999, 
pp. 99–124); and recently the labor movement spent considerable re-
sources in trying to pass legislation to prevent the use of permanent 
striker replacements (Gould 1993, pp. 181–203).
Employers have also signaled their displeasure with certain aspects 
of labor policy, most notably the NLRA’s restrictions on employer-dom-
inated labor organizations, which might restrict the establishment of 
employee-involvement programs. The TEAM Act attempted to amend 
the NLRA to allow employers greater latitude in establishing such pro-
grams (U.S. Senate 1995). Narrower issues, such as the use of “salting” 
as an organizing tactic by building trades unions and the so-called “gar-
ment industry provisos,” which provide exceptions to the NLRA’s “hot 
cargo” proscription, have also been criticized by employers (Bodah 
1999; U.S. House of Representatives 1999). In short, the reports of at 
least two government commissions—the Commission on the Future of 
Worker-Management Relations appointed by President Clinton (i.e., the 
Dunlop Commission) and the American Worker at a Crossroads Proj-
ect, led by Republican Representative Peter Hoekstra—are filled with 
both labor and management complaints about U.S. labor policy (U.S. 
Department of Labor 1994; U.S. House of Representatives 1999). 
This lack of consensus is also reflected in the decisions of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which has been criticized by 
both scholars (Cooke and Gautschi 1982; Cooke et al. 1995; Estreicher 
1985) and the federal courts (Mosey Manufacturing v. NLRB 701 F2d 
610, 1983) for its decisional oscillations. Indeed, over the years, Con-
gress has held a number of hearings concerning abrupt changes by the 
board in the application of legal standards (see Bodah [2001] for a list 
of such hearings). Clearly, the “balance” mentioned by defenders of the 
status quo has not resulted in any sense of equilibrium in national labor 
policy. Instead, we have seen wide swings in the application of labor 
statutes, accompanied by a general erosion of the legal status of collec-
tive bargaining (Gross 1995). Gross (1994, p. 53), in an article entitled 
“The Demise of National Labor Policy: A Question of Social Justice,” 
writes:
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This country needs a definite, coherent, and consistent national 
labor policy. That requires more than changing NLRB case doc-
trines or amending Taft Hartley to tighten or loosen government 
regulation of the labor-management relationship. The recrafting of 
a national labor policy must begin with a precise and certain state-
ment of its purposes and objectives. Fundamental questions must 
be confronted and answered.
The Gap between U.S. Law and the Requirements of 
Conventions 87 and 98
A second assertion is that current U.S. standards generally conform 
to at least the spirit of Conventions 87 and 98. This is easily challenged. 
The U.S. government itself admitted to a lack of conformance in the 
Review of Annual Reports under the Follow-up to the ILO Declaration 
on the Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. After beginning 
on a positive note in stating that “[t]he United States recognizes, and 
is committed to, the fundamental principle of freedom of association 
and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining” (ILO 
2000, p. 144), the report later states: “Nonetheless, the United States 
acknowledges that there are aspects of this system that fail to fully pro-
tect the rights to organize and bargain collectively of all employees in 
all circumstances” (ILO 2000, p. 153). It went on to cite evidence from 
the Dunlop Commission’s Fact-Finding Report, including the frequent 
firing of union activists, the failure of many newly organized units to 
achieve a first contract, union organizers’ lack of access to employees, 
and generally insufficient remedies available to the NLRB. The report 
also cited the United States’s lack of protection for economic strikers.
In the same report, the observations submitted by the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) were even more critical. 
Too lengthy to summarize adequately, the ICFTU’s indictment con-
tained at least two dozen specific shortcomings of U.S. labor law at each 
stage of the collective bargaining process (ILO 2000, pp. 160–163). The 
ICFTU noted the harsh treatment and insufficient remedies available to 
union activists; employers’ union avoidance strategies, such as the fre-
quent use of antiunion consultants, the failure of new units to get first 
contracts, and the restrictions on certain types of concerted activities. 
The ICFTU was also critical of U.S. labor policy in the public sector, 
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noting the severe limits on bargaining subjects in certain jurisdictions 
and broad restrictions on striking. 
Yet another source of evidence of the gap between ILO standards 
and U.S. labor policy is the findings of the ILO Committee on Freedom 
of Association (CFA). All members of the ILO have a responsibility 
to respect the freedom of association and right to bargain collectively 
(Gernigon, Odero, and Guido 2000; Hodges-Aeberhard 1989; Interna-
tional Labour Review [ILR] 1949). In 1950, the ILO set up a special 
tripartite committee to monitor compliance. Unlike other ILO commit-
tees, complaints can be lodged with the CFA even if a country has not 
ratified the corresponding conventions (Freeman 1999). Since its estab-
lishment, the CFA has issued 32 decisions involving the United States. 
Focusing only on cases since reaffiliation, the CFA has found U.S. 
labor policy at variance with ILO standards in number of cases.14 In 
Case 1557 (1993), the CFA requested the U.S. government to “ . . . draw 
the attention of the authorities concerned, and in particular in those ju-
risdictions where public servants are totally or substantially deprived 
of collective bargaining rights, to the principle that all public services 
workers other than those engaged in the administration of the State 
should enjoy such rights . . . ” In Case 1543 (1991), the CFA stated that 
“ . . . recourse to the use of labour drawn from outside the undertaking 
to replace strikers for an indeterminate period entails a risk of deroga-
tion from the right to strike, which may affect the free exercise of trade 
union rights.” In Case 1523 (1992), the CFA “requests the Government 
to guarantee access of trade union representatives to the workplace, with 
due respect to for the rights of property and management, so that trade 
unions can communicate with workers, in order to apprise them of the 
potential advantages of unionization.” In Case 1467 (1989), the CFA 
indicated its “regret” over the “excessive length of appeals procedures” 
for unfair labor practices. Case 1467 also includes: “the CFA points 
out with concern that this is the fourth recent complaint lodged—by 
different complainants—against the United States on the grounds of 
antiunion tactics and unfair labor practices . . . ” In Case 1437 (1988), 
the CFA wrote that “subcontracting accompanied by the dismissal of 
union leaders can constitute a violation of principle that no one should 
be prejudiced in his employment on the grounds of union membership 
and activities.” In Case 1074 (1982), the CFA stated that it was “of the 
view that the application of excessively severe sanctions (i.e., the ter-
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mination of air traffic controllers) against public servants on account of 
their participation in a strike cannot be conducive to the development of 
harmonious industrial relations.”15
Finally, we offer the 2000 Human Rights Watch (HRW) report Un-
fair Advantage: Workers’ Freedom of Association in the United States 
under International Human Rights Standards as evidence of the short-
comings in U.S. labor policy (HRW 2000). The HRW report contains 
15 general findings of variance between U.S. and international labor 
standards, and several more concerning the rights of immigrant and ag-
ricultural workers. Most of the charges against U.S. labor policy con-
cern limits on the freedom of association resulting from inadequate pro-
tections for union activists during the organizing process—specifically, 
HRW notes, discrimination against union supporters, a lack of access 
to employees by union organizers, and imbalances in communication 
power between employers and unions.
The Federal–State Issue
Finally, we take issue with the assertion that the United States’s 
federal structure is a bar to ratification of Conventions 87 and 98. First, 
we note that there are two (somewhat contradictory) streams to this 
argument. Some argue that the ratification of Conventions 87 and/or 98 
would (or could) override certain aspects of current federal labor law 
and the prerogatives of the states; others argue that ratification would 
not be self-executing and, therefore, the United States would be out of 
compliance with conventions unless the federal government and many 
states changed their current statutes (Bradley 1998; Potter 1984; U.S. 
Senate 1985).
Starting with the latter, we recognize that the United States could be 
criticized for not being in compliance with ratified conventions based on 
the actions (or inactions) of the states—in fact, this situation has arisen 
elsewhere. For example, there have been a number of cases brought 
against Canada for the actions of its provinces (see, for example, CFA 
Case 327 [2002] and CFA Case 324 [2001]). However, typically, the 
Canadian government has forwarded the CFA’s charges to the prov-
inces for their response. We would expect that the U.S. Department of 
Labor could do the same for the states. 
The United States and ILO Conventions 87 and 98   239
If the ratification of either Conventions 87 or 98 were self-execut-
ing, the United States could still be found out of compliance if the fed-
eral government or the states did not take effective action to see that 
the provisions of the conventions were, in fact, put into practice. Potter 
(1984. p. 81, note 258) notes that Mexico continued to be criticized by 
the ILO for not truly carrying out the requirements of Conventions 87 
and 98 after ratification. But a larger fear seems to be that Conventions 
87 and 98 would effectively override or void contrary federal or state 
statutes in the eyes of the courts. We respond by citing the comments of 
the Secretary of Labor in recommending to President Truman in 1949 
that he seek ratification of Convention 87 by the Senate, and to the com-
ments of the Solicitor of Labor in a briefing paper written in 1980.16 
In 1949 (U.S. Senate 1949, p. 9) the Secretary of Labor wrote:
It is our view that the subject matter of this convention [No. 87] is 
appropriate under our system for federal action . . . 
It is our view that this convention should be ratified by the Unit-
ed States, and we recommend that the President of United States 
transmit this convention to the Senate of the United States with a 
request for the advice and consent of the Senate to its ratification. 
It is also our view that no new Federal legislation or revision of ex-
isting Federal law is necessary to effect compliance by the United 
States with the terms of this convention.
In 1980, the Solicitor of Labor (U.S. Department of Labor 1980, 
p. 1) wrote:
Although it is our conclusion that Convention 87 may unequivo-
cally be ratified by the United States without entailing any under-
taking to enact legislation or to modify existing law, we recog-
nize that some parties may still anticipate that ratification would 
unwillingly nullify domestic legislation through creative judicial 
construction. 
The solicitor went on to suggest two strategies that “would abso-
lutely preclude such a result”:
First, the Convention could be ratified with a declaration that it is 
non-self-executing. Second, the Convention could be ratified with 
an understanding that ‘all necessary and appropriate measures’ as 
provided by Article 11 means, in the context of the United States, 
that the obligations contained in the Convention have been acced-
ed to only to the extent of the Commerce Power.
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Although Convention 98 was never subjected to such analysis by 
the federal government, we believe that such provisos could also be 
used to avoid upsetting existing statutes.
It has been noted (Potter 1984, pp. 78–82) that it is the ILO and not 
a member state that ultimately determines whether a nation has met its 
obligation. The Committee of Experts, Committee on the Application 
of Conventions and Recommendations, and the CFA could all continue 
to find fault with the United States’s implementation of Conventions 87 
and 98. However, as mentioned earlier, Conventions 87 and 98 are un-
usual in that member states are subject to criticism by the CFA whether 
they have ratified the conventions or not. Hence, the United States can-
not (and has not) escaped international rebuke by simply refusing to 
ratify the conventions. 
The current powers of the CFA do not, however, mean that ratifica-
tion is superfluous. Article 19 (5) of the ILO Constitution requires mem-
ber states to seek ratification of approved conventions.17 Conformance 
is not a substitute for ratification. This remains true even after adoption 
of the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. 
CONCLUSION
In this chapter we have presented and critiqued U.S. policy toward 
the ratification of ILO Conventions 87 and 98. We believe that the prin-
cipal reasons for not ratifying these conventions are contradicted by a 
careful analysis of the documentary evidence and historical record. 
The current political climate would seem to preclude adoption of 
the ILO conventions on freedom of association and collective bargain-
ing. However, were the balance of power to shift in the White House 
or the Senate, we believe that these conventions should be considered 
by the President’s Committee on the ILO and TAPILS, and that hear-
ings might be held by the U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, 
Labor, and Pensions. Public consideration of Conventions 87 and 98 
would be both a way into clarifying labor policy in the United States 
and might also lend support to key U.S. foreign policy goals. 
As Gross (1994) writes, “The recrafting of a national labor policy 
must begin with a precise and certain statement of its purposes and 
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objectives. Fundamental questions must be confronted and answered.” 
While clearly stated in the preamble of the Wagner Act, U.S. labor pol-
icy was obfuscated by the Taft-Hartley Amendments and subsequent 
NLRB and court decisions. Is it U.S. policy to encourage collective 
bargaining or merely to provide a means for employees to vote for or 
against union representation (Gross 1985)? 
As well, we accept George Schultz’s conclusion that the lack of rati-
fication by the United States erodes its moral authority abroad. This is 
particularly important if the United States wishes—for humanitarian or 
purely pragmatic economic reasons—to urge the enforcement of labor 
standards in the developing world.
In its second report to the Secretary and the President, in December 
2002, the State department’s Advisory Commission on Labor Diplo-
macy argued strongly that the promotion of internationally recognized 
core labor rights supports current U.S. foreign policy goals:
Trade unions exist in varying degrees in Muslim countries and 
have a role to play in the struggle against terrorism and for democ-
racy. However, there is often little protection in law or practice for 
trade unionists. The Middle East stands out as the region where the 
right to organize trade unions is least likely to be protected by law. 
Where unions do exist, their independence is often threatened by 
authoritarian governments on the one hand and Islamist political 
factions on the other. A policy that aims to cultivate union leader-
ship at the enterprise and industry levels represents a promising 
approach to inculcate modern economic incentives and democratic 
political values among workers in Muslim countries. (U.S. Depart-
ment of State 2001)
Among its suggestions, the committee includes revisiting the ratifi-
cation of ILO core labor standards: 
The United States has one of the worst records of ratification of 
ILO conventions of any member state of the ILO, especially of 
the core labor conventions. This failure to ratify the core conven-
tions undermines U.S. efforts to lead the international campaign to 
eliminate child labor, forced labor, and discrimination. (U.S. De-
partment of State 2001)
As was the case during the cold war, the United States could find 
the ratification of ILO conventions expedient in advancing its foreign 
policy objectives. The ratification of either Convention 87 or 98 would 
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promote the type of moral suasion envisioned by the advisory commis-
sion.
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 1. In comparison, the number of conventions ratified by the other “Group of Eight” 
large industrialized nations is: Canada, 30; France, 116; Germany, 77; Italy, 109; 
Japan, 46; Russia, 58; and the United Kingdom, 85.
 2. The eight core conventions concern fundamental principles of human rights at 
work: the elimination of forced and compulsory labor, the elimination of em-
ployment discrimination, the abolition of child labor, and the freedom of associa-
tion and right to bargain collectively (ILO 1998). Two conventions correspond 
to each of these areas. The United States has ratified only Conventions 105 and 
182 concerning the abolition of forced labor and the abolition of the worst forms 
of child labor, respectively—with the former ratified 34 years after its adoption 
(ILOLEX 2002). 
 3. They are Armenia, Bahrain, Burma, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Eritrea, Gambia, 
Georgia, Iran, Kiribati, Laos, Mongolia, Namibia, Nepal, Oman, Qatar, St. Kitts, 
Sao Tome, Sudan, Thailand, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, and Uzbeki-
stan.
 4. Convention 144 reaffirms the ILO’s tripartite structure by assuring that labor and 
employer associations, along with governments, may respond to ILO requests 
for information; Convention 160 pledges support for the ILO’s statistics gather-
ing activities; and Convention 150 requires nations to support labor bureaus for 
the purpose of enforcing national labor standards.
 5. The full texts of conventions are available on-line at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/
english/convdisp1.htm. The critical section of Convention 87 (Article 2) states: 
“Workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right 
to establish, and, subject only to the rules of the organization concerned, to join 
organizations of their own choosing without authorization.” The critical section 
of Convention 98 (Article 4) states: “Measures appropriate to national conditions 
shall be taken, where necessary, to encourage and promote the full development 
and utilization of machinery for voluntary negotiation between employers or em-
ployers’ organizations and workers’ organizations, with a view to the regulation 
of terms and conditions of employment by means of collective agreements.”
The United States and ILO Conventions 87 and 98   243
 6. See ILO Constitution, Annex, Article III at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/
about/iloconst.htm#annex.
 7. Principally, the National Labor Relations Act, Railway Labor Act, and Civil Ser-
vice Reform Act.
 8. In 1920, the Court overturned a lower court’s ruling that a federal statute pro-
tecting migratory birds (which had been passed to fulfill treaty obligations with 
the United Kingdom) violated the Tenth Amendment (which addresses powers 
reserved to the states). In Missouri v. Holland (252 U.S. 416, 1920), the Supreme 
Court held that the federal government has the authority to pass all laws “neces-
sary and proper” for carrying out its treaty-making prerogatives. Therefore, some 
argued that, based on Missouri v. Holland, the federal government’s ability to 
ratify ILO conventions is not “subject to limitations,” the necessary trigger for 
the federal–state proviso to take effect (Chamberlain 1920; Tayler 1935). Adding 
to the fears of those who thought that the UN would put the country on the road 
to world government were the Supreme Court’s decision in Oyama v. California 
(332 U.S. 633, 1948) and the subsequent adoption of the UN Declaration of Hu-
man Rights. In Oyama, the Supreme Court overturned a California law (arising 
out of anti-Japanese hysteria) that prohibited land ownership by aliens. While 
the Court relied primarily on the Fourteenth Amendment for its decision, four 
justices also cited Articles 55 and 56 of the UN charter in voiding the law. Soon 
after Oyama, the UN Declaration on Human Rights was adopted causing fear 
among conservatives that social and economic policies of the UN would, among 
other things, overturn segregation laws and interfere with the property rights of 
business (Tananbaum 1988, p. 6).
 9. Bricker portrayed the ILO as a tool of socialism largely at odds with the values 
of the American people. Such attitudes are still heard in Congress, although other 
elected representatives have sometimes seen the ILO as a bulwark of “free enter-
prise” (Hatch in U.S. Senate 1985, p. 12). McIntyre and Ramstad (2003) present 
an analysis of the ILO as embodying the commitments of Institutional Labor 
Economics. Official U.S. policy has generally been supportive of the work of 
the ILO, at least since reentry at the beginning of the 1980s. This support has not 
extended to U.S. ratification of conventions, our focus here. 
 10. Unfortunately, the business of the President’s Committee is difficult to examine, 
since it typically meets behind closed doors in the interest of national security 
and to protect the confidentiality of U.S. treaty negotiating positions.
 11. Potter argued that Convention 87 would subordinate employee rights to those of 
the union; would broaden the classes of workers covered by labor law; would re-
voke portions of the Landrum-Griffin Act, particularly those prohibiting persons 
with criminal records from holding union office; would repeal employer free 
speech provisions of the NLRA; would limit restrictions on the right to strike and 
secondary boycotts; would prohibit restrictions on union participation by mem-
bers of subversive organizations; would repeal prohibitions on hot cargo agree-
ments; would restrict the withdrawal of exclusive representation; would revoke 
limitations on the use of union monies for political purposes; and would remove 
limitations on the disaffiliation of local unions from national bodies and the dis-
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solution of multiemployer units. According to Potter, Convention 98 would have 
many of the same effects, but also would limit discretion in instituting wage/
price controls; would prohibit legislation restricting the scope of bargaining and 
distinctions between mandatory and permissive subjects; would provide union 
officials with special job protections; would modify the burden of proof and rem-
edies under NLRA Section 10(c) [which concerns NLRB remedies]; and would 
put the United States at the mercy of evolving ILO standards.
 12. The USCIB is the official U.S. employer representative to the ILO. It took over 
this role from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in 1980. 
 13. The Railway Labor Act was passed in 1926 and the National Labor Relations 
Act in 1935. Elements of both acts can be found in the Erdman Act, which was 
passed in 1898 but subsequently found unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme 
Court (Millis and Montgomery 1945, pp. 731–732).
 14. CFA cases can be found on-line at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/caseframeE.
htm.
 15. According to interviews with ILO officials in Geneva, CFA filings from the Unit-
ed States tailed off in the nineties because the AFL-CIO was willing to give the 
Clinton administration the benefit of the doubt. 
 16. The secretary was speaking on behalf of the departments of labor, state, justice, 
interior, navy, and the Federal Security Agency, all of which reviewed Conven-
tion 87.
 17. The ILO Constitution is available on-line at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/
about/iloconst.htm#a19p2.
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